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PROLOGUE
The second Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) will be held in Seoul, South Korea, on March 26-27, 2012. 
This summit, officially named “The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit,” will be the largest such 
meeting held in Korea in modern Korean history, just as the 2010 session was the largest summit ever 
held in Washington, DC. 
The first Nuclear Security Summit took place in April 2010 in Washington, DC at US President Barack 
Obama’s invitation. In his historic Prague speech on April 5, 2009, President Obama promoted “nuclear 
security” as one of three strategic goals, along with nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, to achieve 
his vision of “a world without nuclear weapons.”1 In order to strengthen nuclear security, the President 
called for “new international efforts to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four 
years,” and proposed to hold a global summit in 2010.2
In order to materialize his policy ideas, President Obama personally chaired a United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) meeting that adopted the UNSC Resolution 1887 in September 2009. The resolution, 
which was unanimously adopted, agreed to convene a nuclear security summit in 2010, secure nuclear 
material within four years, minimize the use of highly enriched uranium, and facilitate international 
cooperation in order to prevent nuclear terrorism. Accordingly, the 2010 summit brought together leaders 
from 47 states and representatives from three international organizations—the UN, IAEA, and EU. 
Moreover, summit participants agreed to hold a second summit in Seoul two years later. After concluding 
the Washington Summit successfully, global attention has now turned to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security 
Summit. 
This paper looks at South Korean and international efforts to prepare for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security 
Summit and tries to answer the following questions: Why was Korea chosen as the second host state? 
What are the goals and significance of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit? What will be on the agenda, 
inherited and new, at the 2012 meeting and how was the Seoul Communiqué prepared? How has South 
Korea been preparing for this summit and its parallel events—the 2012 Nuclear Security Symposium for 
nongovernment organizations and the Nuclear Industry Summit? Finally, will there be more summits after 
a third meeting in 2014?
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BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2012 SEOUL SUMMIT 
1. Background
While the Nuclear Security Summit was held largely in response to an initiative started by President 
Obama, the need for stronger measures to protect nuclear material and to prevent nuclear terrorism has 
been raised since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001.  
In his 2009 Prague speech, President Obama warned that nuclear terrorism was “the most immediate and 
extreme threat to global security.” This warning was echoed in the 2010 Washington Communiqué, when 
it stated that “nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong 
nuclear security measures are the most effective means.” 
President Obama was not the first to highlight the danger of nuclear terrorism. After the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in 2001, there had been repeated warnings. The UNSC Resolution 1540 in 2004 stated that it was 
“gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors...may acquire, develop, 
traffic in or use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery.” IAEA Director-
General Mohamed ElBaradei also warned in his speech at the 2008 IAEA Annual Conference that 
“nuclear terrorism is the Number One security threat right now. If they get it, they will use it.” 
Today’s world is such that political, security, and economic uncertainties are everywhere and expanding. 
International order and certainty under uni-polar, bi-polar, multi-polar, and balance of power systems 
are long gone, and a new and stable order has yet to come. One symptom has been an increasing number 
of terrorist attacks causing massive and indiscriminate destruction. Since 2000, there have been over 
30 cases of terrorist attacks around the world with over 100 deaths. This trend may continue as global 
uncertainties remain. 
According to a 2010 International Panel of Fissile Materials (IPFM) report, there are over 2,100 tons of 
fissile material stock in the world—1,600 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and about 500 tons 
of separated plutonium3—enough to produce over 100,000 nuclear weapons. A large stock of HEU for 
civilian use is a cause for special concern since it is under far less protection than material for military 
use, and since the gun-type HEU bomb requires less engineering skills in assembly and explosion than 
the plutonium-core explosion bomb. The IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database also shows that nuclear and 
radiological terrorism can occur, as there have been over 20 cases of illicit use or trade of HEU and 
plutonium from1993 to 2011.4     
Recognizing the serious danger of diversion of nuclear material to unauthorized uses or terrorist attacks, 
there have been intermittent international efforts to secure and protect this material.5 However, these 
efforts have never been strong, fast, or sufficient enough to keep the world secure and safe from the 
dangers of nuclear and radiological terrorism threats.
International laws on nuclear security are still at an early stage of formation and lack binding force in 
most cases. The only two international treaties on nuclear security with binding force are the Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).   
The CPPNM, which came into effect in February 1987, is the only legally binding international 
instrument dealing with physical protection of nuclear material and other radiological sources. It requires 
national legislation to prevent and punish nuclear material-related offenses. While the initial CPPNM only 
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covered international transportation of nuclear material, the 2005 Amendment called for the protection 
of nuclear material in peaceful domestic use, storage, and transport as well as at nuclear facilities. This 
new amendment also asks for states to respond quickly to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear 
material, to mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and to prevent and combat related 
offenses. Since the 2005 Amendment is not yet in effect, lacking ratification by the required two-thirds 
of member states, its early effectuation has become one of the primary goals of the Nuclear Security 
Summit.
The ICSANT, based on the draft first proposed by Russia in 1998, was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly and opened for signing in 2005. This is a key element of global efforts to prevent 
terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. The convention provides for a definition 
of acts of nuclear terrorism, and covers a broad range of offenses including those against nuclear power 
plants and nuclear reactors. The ICSANT also obligates states to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders, 
and encourages them to share information and assist each other during criminal investigations and 
extradition proceedings. 
The status of these two critical nuclear security conventions shows that international laws on nuclear 
security are still at an early stage of development, in comparison to the laws in other nuclear fields such as 
nonproliferation and nuclear safety. International cooperation in the nuclear security area is also slow and 
weak. 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 were a wake-up call that alarmed the international community with the 
looming danger of nuclear terrorism and necessitated a quick reaction. Against this backdrop, promising 
new nuclear security measures were launched. However, a shortage of resources, high-level attention, 
international coordination, and global norms has limited their effects.
First, the UNSC adopted UNSC Resolution 1540 in 2004 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This 
resolution binds UN member states to stop supporting non-State actors seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, to adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting the proliferation of such items to non-State 
actors and their financing, and to enforce effective measures for nonproliferation. Though the UNSCR 
1540 Committee was established to accelerate implementation of the Resolution, its mandates and 
resources have been insufficient to fulfill its goals of nonproliferation and nuclear security.      
Second, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction 
(the Global Partnership) was launched at the June 2002 Kananaskis G-8 Summit. A decade-long 
commitment, the Global Partnership pursues nonproliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism, and nuclear 
safety issues through cooperative projects for the destruction and dismantlement of WMD, disposition of 
fissile materials, and retraining of former weapons scientists for new civilian jobs. The Global Partnership 
is an expansion of the US-led Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which has been conducted 
in the former Soviet Union since 1992. In this regard, this US-led nuclear security endeavor evolved 
from the unilateral CTR program into the multilateral G-8 Global Partnership in 2002, and finally into the 
much larger Nuclear Security Summit in 2010.   
Third, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), proposed and co-chaired by the US 
and Russia, was launched in 2006 to develop a partnership to combat nuclear terrorism. The GICNT is 
a voluntary cooperative framework that, as of 2011, has been joined by 82 members and four observers. 
Members have been asked on a “voluntary basis” to implement principles such as developing accounting, 
control, and physical protection systems for nuclear and radioactive materials; enhancing the security 
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of civilian nuclear facilities; improving detection capabilities to prevent the illicit trafficking of such 
materials; and supporting the IAEA’s nuclear security functions. 
Finally, the IAEA’s nuclear security functions were expanded in order to adapt to a new international 
security environment after the 9/11 incident. First, the IAEA’s Information Circular (INFCIRC) 225, 
which provides guidance and recommendations for developing and implementing the physical protection 
of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, was revised for the fifth time in 2011 and published as 
INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5. Second, the IAEA also published the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013 and 
the IAEA Nuclear Security Series to provide guidelines for nuclear security. Finally, the International 
Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) was created to assist its member states in implementing 
various nuclear security instruments and guidelines. 
Nevertheless, these new initiatives were all handicapped by incomplete and insufficient national 
legislation, lax implementation, and their voluntary nature. Bearing in the mind that the global nuclear 
security network is only as strong as its weakest link, world leaders responded positively to the call made 
by President Obama in his April 2009 speech in Prague to hold a nuclear security summit with the goal of 
securing all vulnerable nuclear material within four years.6
2. The 2010 Washington Summit
The Washington Nuclear Security Summit was held on April 12-13, 2010 with leaders from 47 states and 
representatives from the UN, IAEA, and EU. At the summit, the leaders pledged to keep nuclear materials 
under control and away from the wrong hands; to continue to evaluate the threat and improve security as 
changing conditions may require; to exchange best practices and information; to support global nuclear 
security efforts; to ratify related treaties; and to provide security assistance as necessary. 
The summit also adopted a Communiqué, the highest-level political statement for nuclear security, and 
a Work Plan, which offers guidance for national and international actions to carry out the pledges of the 
Communiqué and outlines specific steps that need to be taken to bring the vision of the Communiqué 
into reality.7 Finally, 27 countries made voluntary national commitments to support the summit through 
additional nuclear security actions.
While largely praised as a success, the Washington Summit reflects the current developmental stage of the 
global nuclear security regime and the unique nature of nuclear security. 
First, global leaders at the summit shared the common perception of the threat of nuclear terrorism. 
During the working dinner held on April 12, 2010 to “evaluate the threat of nuclear terrorism,” leaders 
agreed that it is a serious and immediate threat and that any state could be a target of nuclear terrorism. 
Despite this seemingly common understanding at the summit, the level and urgency of that threat 
perception still varies widely among states and regions. 
Second, there are still no binding international security conventions or standards that ensure individual 
countries will adopt adequate levels of protection for nuclear material. The Washington Summit reflected 
these limitations. In order to reach a consensus, participants often had to be content with a low common 
denominator and voluntary measures. The emphasis on the so-called house gifts, voluntary state 
commitments, also reflected the limitations of the international nuclear security regime.
A third notable characteristic of the Washington Summit was the participation of nongovernmental 
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organizations and experts at parallel events. The summit recognized that the participation of experts, 
academia, industry, and nongovernmental organizations was an integral part of the global nuclear security 
regime. 
3. The Decision to Hold the Second Summit in Korea 
Immediately after the first session of the Washington Summit on April 13, 2010, South Korean President 
Lee Myung-bak held a press conference at which he announced that the Republic of Korea had been 
selected to host the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. According to President Lee, Seoul was chosen during 
the first session of the summit when “President Obama proposed Seoul to be the host of the next summit 
and all other summits agreed by a consensus.”   
Washington had begun exploring Seoul as a serious candidate for the host of the second summit in early 
April 2010, less than two weeks before the Washington Summit. Looking into the background of this 
decision, the Korean media reported that the first high-level consultation between the US and Korea took 
place on April 1, 2010, when President Obama called President Lee to discuss various security issues. 
During the conversation, President Obama also asked if Korea could host the next summit. President Lee 
responded positively, but not conclusively at the time. 
Seoul finally decided to accept the US offer to host the second summit at the Sherpa Meeting on April 9, 
2010, leaving a formal and final decision to the April 12-13 summit. It was then reported that at the first 
session of the summit President Obama announced, “President Lee Myung-bak agreed to host the 2012 
Summit. I appreciate Korea’s decision to willingly host the next Summit that reflects its leadership in 
Asian and global affairs.” Russia was initially raised as a strong candidate to host the second summit, but 
in the consultation process, however, it decided not to accept the offer.       
4. Significance and Goals of the 2012 Seoul Summit: A Korean Perspective
	 The	Significance	of	the	Seoul	Summit
The ROK public and government welcomed President Obama’s decision to award the second summit to 
South Korea. Ambassador Kim Bong-hyeon, ROK Sherpa to the Seoul Summit, explains the significance 
of Korea’s role as the host and chair.8
First, serving as the host and chair of the Nuclear Security Summit is very meaningful in the post-Cold 
War era, in particular after the 9/11 attacks. South Korea has always been an active participant in various 
global efforts to forge a better and more peaceful world. Especially in this age of globalization, nuclear 
terrorism is a common challenge to the international community that requires responsible actions not 
only by the US and Western countries, but also by all members of the global community, including South 
Korea.9 Nuclear and radiological terrorism anywhere can become nuclear and radiological terrorism 
everywhere. The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit is a significant work-in-progress, building on the 
ground work laid out during the 2010 summit intended to address that danger.
Second, the hosting of the second NSS will demonstrate the leading status of South Korea on the 
international stage. While there are many countries with deeper interests and influence in the nuclear 
security field, South Korea was chosen as host, in part in recognition of its excellent record in the fields of 
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nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear security, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, despite an ever-present 
North Korean nuclear threat. ROK leadership in global problem solving on such issues as climate change, 
economic crisis, and nuclear nonproliferation might have also played a part. Furthermore, Korea is also 
known for its bridging diplomacy as a middle power which contributes greatly to addressing global issues 
as was demonstrated at the 2010 G-20 Summit in Seoul. 
Third, the Seoul Summit will address all major issues in the field of nuclear security, including responses 
to nuclear terrorism, the protection of nuclear materials and facilities, and the prevention of illicit nuclear 
trafficking. It is also expected to expand the scope of these discussions. For example, the security of 
radioactive sources, which had been set aside at the Washington Summit, will be reintroduced. The 
Fukushima nuclear accident showed that radiological terrorism may not only be more likely to occur than 
nuclear terrorism, but could also be just as disastrous.  
Fourth, the Seoul Summit could have positive political implications for the peace and security of the 
Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia. There will be important political changes in the region in 2012: 
North Korea has claimed that it will build a “Strong and Prosperous State” armed with nuclear weapons; 
presidential elections will be held in the US, Russia, and South Korea, and a leadership transition will 
take place in China.10 During this time of change and uncertainty, the news that leaders of major countries 
will gather on the Korean peninsula to discuss international security and world peace will work positively 
for stabilizing the Korean peninsula and for denuclearizing North Korea. Though the North Korean 
nuclear issue is not a nuclear security issue and will not be on the summit agenda, the Korean public 
expects that the Seoul Summit will somehow help restart the denuclearization process.
In summary, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit will be a valuable opportunity to enhance the status 
of South Korea on the international stage. There is little doubt that after successfully hosting the 2010 
G-20 Summit, the premier forum for addressing international economic issues, it will do well in holding a 
successful Nuclear Security Summit as well.
 Goals of the Seoul Summit
The ROK government envisions a world free from the threats of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The 
NSS process is a critical tool that enables world leaders to share not only their perceptions of a nuclear 
terrorism threat, but also their determination to fight it through various nuclear security measures. 
In addition to the shared objectives of nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy set forth in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), world leaders also agree that 
nuclear security is another shared objective.11 Through the Seoul Summit, the ROK government aims to 
present both a practical vision and concrete measures to strengthen nuclear security. It also hopes for the 
summit to help restore confidence in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which has significantly decreased 
since the Fukushima nuclear accident.  
With these goals in mind, the ROK government has identified three key objectives for the Seoul 
Summit.12 First, it will reaffirm and consolidate the political will that was generated at the Washington 
Summit. Second, it will further advance the implementation of the agreements made in Washington and to 
secure further commitments. Third, it will contribute to the realization of key nuclear security objectives 
through a Communiqué.
The government has also stipulated three principal agendas for the Seoul Summit to build a world free 
from the threats of nuclear and radiological terrorism and to move “Beyond Security Toward Peace.”13 
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First, the Seoul Summit will seek cooperative measures to fight against the threat of nuclear terrorism. 
These include measures to reinforce international cooperation for the safe and secure management of 
weapons-grade nuclear materials and to thwart illegal trafficking and smuggling. 
Second, it will seek ways to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and related facilities. World 
leaders will aim to reach an agreement on concrete actions to better secure nuclear materials such as 
highly enriched uranium (HEU), separated plutonium, nuclear reactors, and other nuclear facilities. 
Drawing upon the recent Fukushima accident, the potential nuclear safety implications for nuclear 
security will also be examined. 
Third, it will seek ways to prevent radiological materials from falling into the wrong hands. While the 
magnitude of the damage of explosive or dispersal devices using radiological materials, or “dirty bombs,” 
may be smaller than that of nuclear terrorism, the likelihood of its occurrence may be higher as it is easier 
to acquire such material and to assemble dirty bombs. Participating leaders will take these issues into 
account and discuss measures to address this threat of radiological terrorism. 
PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUMMIT AND PARALLEL CONFERENCES
1. Seoul Summit Preparations
 The Summit Preparatory Committee and Secretariat
The ROK government officially started preparing for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Summit in October 2010 
by establishing a preparatory committee chaired by the Prime minister. This is a non-standing, high-level, 
intergovernmental committee whose members include ministers of all related government agencies, the 
heads of related nongovernmental organizations, and civilian experts. The committee performs such 
functions as planning, coordination, and evaluation of the summit preparations.  
Serious mid-level government preparations started in March 2011 with the establishment of the 2012 
Nuclear Security Summit Preparatory Secretariat which is led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade. The Secretariat, which opened its office in May 2011, is endowed with tasks for all administrative 
work and implementation of Summit preparations, protocols, and domestic and international promotion. 
In order to make the Seoul Summit a successful diplomatic event, the Secretariat is planning to utilize all 
available resources, including convention management professionals, and promotion and public relations 
companies, along with many volunteers. US experiences from hosting the 2010 Summit were also passed 
along to the Secretariat and taken into consideration. A successful hosting of the 2010 G-20 Summit has 
served as a guide for the ROK government in organizing this even bigger summit with more than 50 
participating states and international organizations. 
While promoting the Seoul Summit, the ROK government has experienced difficulties in attracting 
attention and support from its people. Those who are interested often do not understand the narrow scope 
of the NSS process. As they live under a daily North Korean nuclear threat, the South Korean public 
expects the Seoul Summit to address that danger as well. They also believe that nuclear safety, another 
palpable and realistic nuclear issue since the Fukushima accident, should be discussed.14 
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Low interest from the general public is not unusual, however. In the US, the Washington Summit drew 
little attention from the public and media as well and was perceived as an event mainly for diplomats and 
experts. To most people, not just in these host states, but elsewhere in the world, nuclear security is a new 
and difficult issue to comprehend. It is also perceived to be less urgent than the continuing economic and 
financial turmoil in many countries, and the upcoming leadership changes in several countries this year 
will inevitably distract the public’s attention further away from nuclear security.
In order to gain greater public support for the Seoul Summit and its nuclear security goals, the ROK 
government and the participating states and international organizations should make more concerted 
efforts through national and international outreach activities. The ROK government has already conducted 
such activities, and will expand these efforts as the summit gets closer. The two pre-summit events, the 
Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium and the Nuclear Industry Summit, will also help attract more public 
and expert attention. 
 Participating States and International Organizations
The 2010 Washington Summit was attended by leaders from 47 states and 3 international organizations. 
According to the US government, the criteria for being invited to the first summit included possession 
of nuclear material, regional distribution, current and planned nuclear energy programs, support for the 
cause of the summit, and extra national commitments.   
While the initial round of invitations was only extended to a small number of states, this number 
increased during the summit preparation process.15 The US had initially only planned to invite about 20 
states—those with stockpiles of nuclear materials and large nuclear energy programs. By the first Sherpa 
Meeting in Vienna in September 2009, however, the number of attendees had already grown to 37 states 
and 3 international organizations. This continued to increase, resulting in 47 states attending the summit 
itself. 
The number of participating states and international organizations remained the same after the 
Washington Summit and throughout the 2011 Sherpa Meetings, with only the addition of INTERPOL. 
However, as new states expressed a strong interest in participating in the Seoul Summit, this number has 
increased as well. The ROK government, as the summit host and chair, holds a positive view of having 
more states participating as long as they support and contribute to the strengthening of the international 
nuclear security regime in a meaningful way.
The absence of North Korea and Iran at the Washington Summit drew unusual media attention. Even 
though these two states possess nuclear material, they were excluded from the summit because of 
the challenges they pose to the global nonproliferation and nuclear security regimes as well as their 
controversial nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, if Iran and North Korea had attended the summit, the 
meeting could have turned into another round of the NPT Review Conference or an expanded Six Party 
Talks scenario. The US did not want any diversion of the summit’s sole focus on nuclear terrorism and 
nuclear security to issues that could be better handled in other existing nuclear fora.
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Participating States and International Organizations of the Seoul Summit (as of 2011.12)16
Region, IOs States (47), International Organizations (4)
Asia (12) Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, India, Indonesia, Japan, People’s Republic of China, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines
The Americas (6) Mexico, the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Canada
Oceania (2) New Zealand, Australia
Europe (18)
the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Russian Federation, Belgium, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Spain, Armenia, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Italy, Georgia, 
Czech Republic, Turkey, Poland, France, Finland
Middle East (7) Morocco, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Jordan, Israel, Egypt
Africa (2) Nigeria, South Africa
International Organizations (4)
United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, European Union, 
INTERPOL
South Korea, however, had a different view about how to handle the issue of North Korea. President 
Lee Myung-bak repeatedly invited North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to the summit on the condition 
that Pyongyang shows a firm commitment to denuclearize. There was little possibility that Kim would 
come to Seoul, considering that he had refused to visit even in much more favorable political conditions 
during the Sunshine Policy period under previous administrations. In addition, he had never attended any 
multilateral summits. With Kim Jong Il’s unexpected death in late December 2011, controversies over the 
proposed invitation have ended. 
 International Advisory Group: Eminent Persons Group
In November 2011, the ROK Government established a 15-member presidential advisory group, 
the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), to advise President Lee Myung-bak on the Seoul Summit. 
The government also wanted these prominent figures to help promote the meeting nationally and 
internationally, because the summit had been receiving less public and media attention than expected. 
Seoul also expects to have an opportunity to raise related nuclear issues such as the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy, nuclear safety, and the North Korean nuclear issue at informal settings like advisory 
meetings or other pre-summit conferences in order to meet the demands from the public and the media.     
The EPG includes well-known statesmen, diplomats, and scholars such as former Indian President Abdul 
Kalam, former Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, former Secretary-General of the IAEA Hans Blix, 
former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, former US State Secretary Henry Kissinger, former US 
Defense Secretary William Perry, former US Senator Sam Nunn, Harvard University Professor Graham 
Allison, ROK Nuclear Safety and Security Commission Chairman Kang Chang-sun, and former ROK 
Foreign Minister Han Seung-joo, among others.
The first EPG meeting was held in Seoul on November 29 at the invitation of President Lee. At this 
advisory meeting, the EPG members advised President Lee on nuclear security issues, expressed their 
support for the Seoul Summit, and offered ideas on how to make it a success. Later that day, the EPG 
adopted the six-point Joint Statement as follows.
1. The Seoul Summit should demonstrate tangible progress in implementing the commitments made 
at the Washington Summit and report that progress. It should propose a practical vision and new 
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concrete measures in the Seoul Communiqué.
2. Participating states should make significant contributions to the objective of strengthening the 
nuclear security regime with voluntary commitments and affirm the essential role of the IAEA.
3. In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Seoul Summit should look for ways to 
strengthen both nuclear safety and security, to prevent radiological terrorism, and to strengthen 
international and regional cooperation mechanisms.
4. It should prevent the illicit transfer of nuclear materials by sharing information and best practices 
and by enhancing national nuclear security capacities.
5. It should support efforts to hold a third summit to provide a political impetus for the nuclear 
security regime strengthening process and to assess President Obama’s four-year nuclear material 
security goal.17
In addition, the EPG recognized that the summit would serve as a “catalyst for realizing a world free of 
nuclear and radiological terrorism” by both reaffirming the principles and the spirit of the Washington 
Summit and reaching agreement on new commitments and measures to enhance nuclear security. 
The EPG also expressed its position on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and radiological security issues 
in the post-Fukushima era. First, it expected that leaders at the summit should enhance public confidence 
in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Second, it urged leaders to make efforts to reduce the threats to 
nuclear facilities and their operating systems by discussing the ways in which nuclear security and nuclear 
safety can be mutually reinforced, bearing in mind the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear 
accident. Third, it recognized that there is a critical need to build up national and regional capabilities to 
deal with the aftermath of a radiological and nuclear accident, regardless of its causes, in order to mitigate 
the consequences. Fourth, noting the possibility and consequences of radiological terrorism, it suggested 
that the summit should seriously deal with the issue of radiological security.
2. Two Parallel Events: Symposium and Industry Summit
Following the precedent of the Washington Summit, two nongovernmental pre-summit conferences will 
be held. The Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium and Nuclear Industry Summit will both be held on 
March 23, 2012 at different locations in Seoul. The Symposium will be a meeting of nuclear security 
experts from nongovernmental organizations, academia, and media, while the Industry Summit will be a 
gathering of experts from nuclear industry and business. 
These two events are meant to symbolize support for the goals of the NSS process by civil society, 
academia, and industry on a global scale. They also symbolize states’ recognition of the roles and 
contributions of civil society, academia, and industry in the global effort to fight nuclear terrorism. 
 The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium
The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium to be held on March 23, 2012, will be co-sponsored by the 
Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and the Institute of Foreign Affairs and 
National Security (IFANS).18
The Symposium organizers plan to invite around 150 foreign participants, including civilian and 
governmental experts from about 50 participating states and four international organizations. In addition 
to national and geographical representations, the organizers also plan to invite nuclear security experts 
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from around the world, as well as members and international partners of the Fissile Material Working 
Group, the Washington-based organizer of the nongovernmental nuclear security conference held in 
conjunction with the 2010 Washington Summit.19 
While programming the Symposium, the organizers intend to achieve the following goals. First, the 
Symposium will attempt to present a vision of global nuclear security governance and a roadmap for the 
future. While struggling to fight nuclear and radiological terrorism today, there is a need to look ahead 
and prepare for the evolving nuclear terrorism threats of the future. Agreement on the vision of a future 
nuclear security framework could lead to agreement on what we should do now to help achieve that 
vision. Second, the Symposium will be a place for NGOs, individuals, and media to network with each 
other and create a stronger global effort going forward. Third, the Symposium can help build a private-
individual-state-international partnership against nuclear terrorism. Finally, the Symposium will provide 
participants with the best opportunity to share information, values, and visions on nuclear security.
The Symposium, subtitled, “Innovating Global Nuclear Security Governance,” will focus on four groups 
of issues: nuclear terrorism threats and nuclear security status, key challenges and solutions, the interface 
between nuclear safety and security, and future global nuclear security governance. In particular, the 
Symposium intends to add to the usual mix of topics a special emphasis on “global nuclear security 
governance.” 
While conventional approaches tend to focus on states and formal treaties, the global governance 
approach recognizes the values of both diversified forms of international norms and multiple actors. This 
inclusive and holistic approach provides a new perspective in dealing with such complicated issues as 
nuclear terrorism in this globalized, networked, and complex world. 
 The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Industry Summit
The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Industry Summit, an industry and business pre-summit event, will also be 
held on March 23, 2012. The Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Corporation (KHNP), host of the Industry 
Summit, plans to bring in over 200 Korean and foreign participants including CEOs from the world’s 
leading nuclear enterprises and delegates from international organizations. 
The Industry Summit, subtitled, “The Role of the Nuclear Industry in Enhancing Nuclear Security and 
Safety,” will discuss the importance of the integrative approach to nuclear security and safety as well as 
the role of the private sector in nuclear security. In order to prepare for substantive discussions and results, 
KHNP established an international advisory committee for the planning and programming of this event. 
It established three working groups on the minimization of civilian use of HEU, the security of sensitive 
information, and the nexus between nuclear security and safety after Fukushima. These groups, comprised 
of experts from major nuclear corporations, will hold a series of seminars beforehand to produce a 
summary communiqué that will be presented to and adopted at the Industry Summit. 
According to KHNP, the summary report of the Industry Summit, or communiqué, will call for more 
specific nuclear security actions, greater responsibility on nuclear security and safety integration, and 
enhanced international cooperation by the industry.
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DRAFTING THE SEOUL COMMUNIQUÉ
1. Governmental Negotiations
 A Two-Stage Negotiation Process
Participating states held a series of negotiations to select the agenda items of the Seoul Summit and 
to draft the Seoul Communiqué. The drafting process proceeded in two stages. During the first stage, 
participating states held preliminary negotiations to look into nuclear security issues for further study 
and improvements coming out of the Washington Communiqué, while also looking for additional agenda 
items for the Seoul Summit. This stage included the first two Sherpa and Sous-Sherpa Meetings: the 
Buenos Aires Sherpa Meeting in November 2011 and the Vienna Sous-Sherpa Meeting in March 2011.
The second stage started with the Seoul Sous-Sherpa Meeting in June 2011 when participating states 
began deliberating on a draft Communiqué that had been proposed by Seoul based on discussions held at 
the two previous Sherpa and Sous-Sherpa Meetings. The ROK government, as summit host and chair, was 
obligated to draft the Seoul Communiqué in consultation with all participating states. 
During the second stage, there were three Sherpa and Sous-Sherpa Meetings: the Seoul Sous-Sherpa 
Meeting in June 2011, the Helsinki Sherpa Meeting in October 2011, and the Delhi Sherpa Meeting in 
January 2012. Since the draft Seoul Communiqué, even after the Delhi Sherpa Meeting, still contains 
a few paragraphs with different positions, there will be one more Sherpa Meeting in Seoul on March 
23, 2012 to complete the draft. However, it is also likely that the draft Communiqué will be completed 
through various bilateral and multilateral dialogue channels even before the final Seoul Sherpa Meeting. 
The second stage drafting process, starting from the Sous-Sherpa Meeting in June 2011, is described 
below.
 Seoul Sous-Sherpa Meeting in June 2011
The Seoul Sous-Sherpa Meeting was held on June 27-28, 2011, with representatives from 47 participating 
states and four international organizations—UN, IAEA, EU, and INTERPOL (INTERPOL is a new 
addition to the summit process). This Sous-Sherpa Meeting was arranged to take place in Seoul right 
before the 2011 General Conference of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in Daejeon a 
few days after the Sous-Sherpa Meeting so that foreign delegations could attend both meetings. The ROK 
Foreign Minister, Kim Sung-hwan, emphasized during his welcoming remarks that Korea, as the chair 
of the Seoul Summit, would make best efforts to ensure that the “Summit will lay out practical visions 
and concrete action plans on nuclear security, thereby contributing to freeing the world from nuclear and 
radiation threats.” 
Throughout the Sous-Sherpa Meeting, delegations discussed and negotiated the draft Seoul Communiqué 
that the government had prepared. The meeting reaffirmed the basic goals and principles on nuclear 
security that were agreed to during the Washington Summit. There were also discussions on additional 
nuclear security measures to protect radioactive material and nuclear facilities as well as nuclear material; 
to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear materials; and to reinforce the international nuclear security 
framework.
In the wake of the disastrous nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, delegations 
also discussed the implications of nuclear safety issues for nuclear security. The Fukushima nuclear 
accident revived discussions of the radiological security issue that had been set aside at the Washington 
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Summit. Overall, based on these talks, Seoul was better prepared to improve the format and agenda of the 
Seoul Communiqué.
 The Helsinki Sherpa Meeting in October 2011 
The next Sherpa Meeting was held on October 4-5, 2011 in Helsinki, Finland. Again delegations from 
47 participating states and four international organizations attended the session. Following the presiding 
arrangements made at the first Buenos Aires Sherpa Meeting in 2010, Kim Bong-hyun, ROK Sherpa and 
Deputy Foreign Minister for Multilateral and Global Affairs, and Gary Samore, US Sherpa and the White 
House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction, co-chaired the meeting. 
The Helsinki Sherpa Meeting made significant progress in shaping the draft Seoul Communiqué in terms 
of format and agenda. In order to continue focused debate and negotiation, the Sherpas agreed to adopt 
five principles for drafting the Communiqué as proposed by the ROK Sherpa: 1) to place nuclear security 
at the center of the discussion; 2) to ensure continuity with the Washington Nuclear Security Summit 
while at the same time making new progress; 3) to confirm the voluntary nature of national commitments 
and participation; 4) to not create a new nuclear security regime; and 5) to respect President Obama’s 
vision to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within four years. 
The Sherpas also agreed to focus their dialogue on the following nuclear security issues: securing high-
risk materials such as highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium; enhancing the protection of 
nuclear facilities; creating synergy between nuclear security and nuclear safety; preventing the illicit 
trafficking of nuclear materials; tightening the management of radioactive materials for dirty bombs; 
encouraging states to join and ratify the ICSANT and the CPPNM; bolstering the global nuclear 
security architecture such as the GICNT, G-8 Global Partnership, and the UNSC 1540 Committee; and 
strengthening the IAEA’s nuclear security activities.20 
There was also a serious debate regarding the inclusion into the Seoul Communiqué of two new issues—
radiological security and the nuclear security and safety interface. On the latter, the Sherpas discussed the 
issue of nuclear safety from the perspective of nuclear security in light of the lessons learned from the 
Fukushima nuclear accident. Despite some reservation and opposition to expand the scope of the agenda 
beyond the Washington Communiqué, a new consensus emerged that these two issues should be included 
on the Summit agenda while focus on nuclear security is maintained. 
Finally the Helsinki Sherpa Meeting succeeded in narrowing differences in views among participating 
countries regarding the structure, direction, and contents of the Seoul Communiqué.  
2. Principles for Drafting the Communiqué 
Though earlier governmental negotiations until mid-2011 were somewhat ambitious in their goals for the 
Seoul Summit, the limits of multilateral diplomacy working under the principle of consensus were soon 
realized. 
Since the Washington Communiqué and Work Plan were very comprehensive, it was difficult for any 
following agreements to go further beyond them. Some countries have wanted to stick strictly to a 
narrowly defined scope of “nuclear security,” warning that any additional issues would “dilute” the key 
objective of the nuclear security summit to prevent “nuclear terrorism.” Others have refused to take 
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on additional responsibilities and the burden of stronger and expanded nuclear security measures that 
potentially go beyond the current regime and the “sovereignty principle” of nuclear security. 
Therefore, discussions at the Helsinki Sherpa Meeting addressed what should be included in the Seoul 
Communiqué—what expectations could be set for participating states that would still ensure its adoption 
at the Summit. This resulted in five guiding principles.
1. Nuclear security remains the main focus of the summit. 
2. The Communiqué should maintain continuity with the first summit while demonstrating progress. 
Since continuation does not mean simple repetition, however, the countries also agreed that the 
Seoul Communiqué should reflect elements of progress in its text as well. 
3. The participation of States and their commitments made in the process of the Nuclear Security 
Summit is voluntary. 
4. The Nuclear Security Summit does not intend to create a new regime. 
5. Participating countries respect the four-year vision of President Obama as announced in his 2009 
Prague speech.21
These five principles were to reconfirm basic objectives of the summit. They were also necessary to 
accelerate the Communiqué negotiation process since some states were not ready to accept any additional 
nuclear security measures beyond those established during the Washington Summit and those of the 
current international nuclear security regime.    
3. Communiqué Agenda
The first Sherpa meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina in early November 2010 agreed to focus its 
discussion on nine issues from the Washington Communiqué and Work Plan that required additional 
study. Nine participating states volunteered to each look into one of these issues, and presented on their 
findings and policy suggestions at the Vienna meeting held March 21-24, 2011.22 
These nine topics included: information security, HEU guidelines, transportation security, illicit 
trafficking prevention, nuclear forensics, nuclear security culture, radioactive sources, treaty ratification, 
and international coordination and cooperation.
Since the November 2010 Buenos Aires Sherpa meeting, it was widely conjectured among experts that 
these nine topics would also become the agenda items for the 2012 Seoul Summit and Communiqué. 
When delegations met for the Sous-Sherpa meeting in March 2011 in Vienna, they began discussing these 
topics based on working papers and presentations by the volunteer countries. In fact, these nine topics 
were not meant to be agenda items, but important issues that needed further study. 
After the Vienna meeting, South Korea took the initiative of drafting a Seoul Communiqué text before 
the June 2011 Seoul Sous-Sherpa meeting. Since then, there have been three rounds of Communiqué 
text negotiations, including the Seoul Sous-Sherpa meeting in June 2010, the Helsinki Sherpa meeting 
in October 2011, and the Delhi Sherpa meeting in January 2012.  There may also be one more Sherpa 
meeting in Seoul just days before the summit to finalize the Communiqué text and to check various event 
arrangements. 
A South Korean representative indicated that the Seoul Communiqué will be one document without a 
separate Work Plan, and that its format and length will be somewhere between that of the Washington 
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Communiqué and the Work Plan. He also indicated that the Seoul Communiqué would include the 
following issues and topics, among others. 
1. Coordination of the Global Nuclear Security Architecture
2. Role of the IAEA
3. Management of Nuclear Materials
4. Transportation Security and Illicit Trafficking Prevention
5. Information Security
6. Nuclear Forensics
7. Nuclear Security Culture
8. International Cooperation 
9. Radiological Security
10. Synergy/Nexus between Nuclear Security and Nuclear Safety23
All of these topics originated with the Washington agreements except two: radiological security and the 
synergy/nexus between nuclear security and nuclear safety. The Washington Summit focused on nuclear 
material and nuclear security to prevent and deter “nuclear terrorism.” 
Why did participating states agree to include these two additional items on the agenda? Their inclusion 
would have been impossible without the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011. Traditionally, 
nuclear terrorism is considered a low probability, but high consequence case, while radiological 
terrorism is a high probability, but low consequence one. After the Fukushima accident, “Fukushima-
like radiological terrorism” became a high probability and high consequence case. These two issues are 
discussed below. 
 Radiological Security
One of the best ways to raise the profile and awareness of radiological material security is to bring this 
issue to the attention of state leaders. The inclusion of radiological source security on the Seoul Summit 
agenda and in the Communiqué sets this summit apart from the Washington Summit, which had been 
primarily to lock down, consolidate, and secure weapon-usable fissile material, including HEU and 
separated plutonium, to prevent nuclear terrorism. 
During the Washington Summit process, there had been debate about the scope of nuclear material 
security: whether or not radiological sources should be included. However, the US wanted to keep a 
narrow focus on nuclear terrorism and nuclear material. The US claimed that nuclear terrorism is a 
low probability, but very high consequence case, while radiological terrorism is a high probability, 
low consequence one. Therefore the Washington Summit was all about security of HEU and separated 
plutonium, except one passing phrase at the end of the Communiqué: “[We] Recognize that measures 
contributing to nuclear material security have value in relation to the security of radioactive substances 
and encourage efforts to security these material as well.”  
While preparing for the 2012 Seoul Summit, the debate over the inclusion of radiological security 
returned. In the meantime, an unusual nuclear accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plants, caused 
by a great tsunami occurred. This accident raised serious concerns that nuclear power plants could be 
vulnerable to targeted terrorist and criminal attacks and the radiological consequences could be extremely 
damaging. Currently the Japanese government imposes a 20 km radius off-the-limit evacuation zone 
around the Fukushima nuclear power plants. Chernobyl maintains a 30 km radius exclusion zone. What 
would happen if there were a radiological terrorism attack in a metropolitan city, and a 20 or 30 km radius 
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exclusion zone were imposed indefinitely?  
After the Fukushima nuclear accident, the world has to deal with both “9/11 nuclear terrorism” and 
“Fukushima radiological terrorism” with similar priority. For most countries without fissile material, 
radiological terrorism appears to have an even higher priority.  
It is expected that the Seoul Summit will address the importance of radiological security as well as the 
effective and secure management of radiological sources, while maintaining a primary focus on nuclear 
material security. Radiological sources—more widely used and dispersed—could be more vulnerable to 
malign acts. Stronger radiological security would enable a wider, safer and more beneficial use of this 
material for medical, agricultural, industrial, and research purposes.
 Synergy/Nexus between Nuclear Security and Nuclear Safety
The nexus between nuclear security and safety has also come to our attention since the Fukushima nuclear 
accident and will be addressed at the Seoul Summit. Even before the Fukushima accident, there were 
efforts to strengthen the interface between nuclear security and safety. The IAEA has been looking for 
ways to integrate its nuclear safety and security functions for some time. Its International Nuclear Safety 
Group published a report titled, “The Interface between Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants,” in 
2010. Concluding that “the security regime at nuclear power plants is far less developed than the safety 
regime,” the report asks for joint management of these two traditionally disparate functions through close 
communication, consultation, and coordination. 
When these two functions are complementary, the joint management system can reinforce each other. 
When these two are conflicting, as in principles of confidentiality vs. transparency or the primary role 
of the state vs. society/industry, a joint management system still could reduce confusion and help find 
optimal solutions.
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also took an initiative of emphasizing the integration of nuclear 
safety and security. While stating that “nuclear accidents respect no borders” at the Summit on the 
Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy on April 19, 2011, remembering the 25th anniversary of 
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, Secretary-General Ban emphatically proposed to “build a 
stronger connection between nuclear safety and security” as one of five steps to enhance nuclear safety.”24
Following a rising demand to strengthen both nuclear security and safety, the Seoul Summit is expected 
to discuss the issue of complementary relations and synergies between the two. Now there is a general 
consensus that, regardless of different causes of nuclear security and safety accidents, their consequences 
will damage humans and environments in a same way. Therefore we need to build effective disaster/
emergency response and mitigation capabilities to cope with both cases of nuclear safety and security 
contingencies, once they occur. In addition, we need to design and manage facilities so that both nuclear 
safety and security concerns are dealt with in a coherent and complementary manner. 
Once the Seoul Summit agrees on the importance of an integrated approach to nuclear security and safety 
and its synergy effect, there will be more concerted efforts by the IAEA, states, nuclear power plant 
operators, and other NGOs to find the best regulations, legislation, and practices to that effect. 
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EPILOGUE
On December 17, 2011, approximately three months before the 2012 Seoul Summit, the ROK 
Government issued a press release reporting that the summit preparations are well underway.
The government and its preparatory Secretariat for the summit are carrying forward its close consultation 
with governments of some 50 participating states regarding the agenda of the summit, while promoting 
the summit at home and conducting active public diplomacy activities for major participating countries. 
Consultation on the “Seoul Communiqué,” which will be adopted as the outcome document of the Seoul 
Summit, is currently well underway and is expected to be completed before the summit commences.  
As the chair of the summit, South Korea has conducted active public diplomacy activities for 
major participating countries. ROK diplomatic missions abroad have held briefings and seminars on the 
summit for foreign government officials, diplomatic corps, research institutions, colleges, and journalists 
to expand the international community’s support for the summit and enhance the ROK’s global stature 
and image.25  
Assuming that the Seoul Summit will be successful, people have begun to raise questions about the future 
of the NSS process beyond the upcoming meeting. What is certain is that there will be the third summit 
in 2014 in the Netherlands. That session will have the specific goal, among others, of evaluating whether 
President Obama’s four-year objective of securing fissile material has been achieved. 
Can we expect another summit after 2014? Though no one can give a definite answer, most agree that 
a fourth summit will not take place in the current format with a nuclear security focus. Nuclear security 
is too specific, technical, and narrow for state leaders to continue regular discussions. If there is a fourth 
summit, it could be a nuclear summit dealing with all aspects of nuclear issues at the highest political 
level. One thing for sure is that there will be a growing consensus that the momentum gained through 
the vision of a nuclear-weapons free world and the NSS process should somehow be maintained and 
remembered. For example, there could be a lower-level nuclear security forum or process like the GICNT 
or a commemorating conference. 
The Nuclear Security Symposium plans to look for answers to this question by discussing a ten-year 
nuclear security plan or a nuclear security vision, which will go beyond the current four-year plan. As 
nuclear and radiological terrorism threats evolve, so should the nuclear security regime. In the third 
summit in 2014, it is expected that a serious discussion on the future of the summits as well as of the 
global nuclear security regime will take place.  
Finally, there is the problem posed by North Korea’s nuclear program, which is presently the most urgent 
and challenging nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. We know that the North Korea nuclear issue will 
not be on the summit agenda, despite the wishes of the South Korean public. However, the public should 
understand that the summit is not about preventing nuclear proliferation by state actors, but about fighting 
nuclear terrorism by non-state actors. They should also understand that it is not about finger-pointing 
and blaming specific states like North Korea, but about building a consensus among all the participating 
countries on strengthening the nuclear security regime. Nonetheless, the South Korean public will still 
expect the world’s leader to note the danger of the North Korean nuclear program and to raise the urgent 
need for denuclearization during the Seoul Summit or at least on its sidelines. 
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